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This paper investigates the existence and character of technological growth diffusion 
in form of learning spillovers at the sector level of the economy.  Based on panel data 
for 47 countries during the postwar period the evidence suggests robust statistical 
regularities of inter-sectoral learning resulting from a changing structure of demand.  
The findings further show differences in the magnitude of productivity spillovers 
across sectors.  In particular, the patterns reveal a distinctive role for upstream 
production activities esp. manufacturing as a source of diffusion.  When the 
technological growth potential of sectors in low-income economies is compared to 
high-income countries the empirical evidence does not show a tendency for catching 
up to occur.  However, higher potential for inter-sectoral diffusion of technological 
growth is associated with (i) low income concentration, and (ii) high public (human 




*MERIT, Economics Department, Maastricht University 
P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands 
Email: ute.pieper@merit.unimaas.nl ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Comments by Thorsten Block, Duncan Foley, Catherine Saget, Eddy Szirmai, Nick 
von Tunzelmann, and participants at the Eindhoven Centre for Innovation Studies 
conference, “The Future of Innovation Studies,” September 21-23, 2001, are 
gratefully acknowledged. I also wish to thank Duncan Campbell, Eugene Canjels, 
Philippe Egger, Ajit Ghose, Rolph van der Hoeven, and Pierre Mohnen for helpful 
discussions and suggestions. Many friends and colleagues have supported this study 
by providing country data, I am indebted to all of them, especially Luciano Amaral, 
Matti Hannikainen, Adalmir Marquetti, the Austrian Trade Commission and 
Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, and last but not least the International 
Labour Office in Geneva. This research was supported by a Marie Curie Fellowship 
of the European Commission under contract no. HPMF-CT-1999-00204. Contents 
 
1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
 
2.  Some concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
2.1  Diffusion, productivity spillovers, and technological growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 
2.2  Conceptualizing the process of technological growth diffusion . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
2.3  A simple model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
 
3.  A matrix of learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 
3.1  Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
3.2 Estimates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
 
4.   Inter-sectoral productivity spillovers, income level, and concentration . . . . . 15 
4.1  Inter-sectoral spillovers and catching up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 
4.2  Manufacturing activities as source for growth diffusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 
4.3 Income  concentration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 
 
5.  Public capital stocks and productivity spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
5.1 Human  capital. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 
5.2  Infrastructure investment and capital stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 
 
6.  Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 
 
 
Data Appendix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 








   1 
1. Introduction 
Doubtless, technological change and its diffusion across time and space is one of the 
most important factors in understanding long-run economic development and persistent 
divergence of particularly income per capita.  Corresponding stylized facts that have been 
identified in the growth literature during the past two to three decades further suggest to be more 
consistent with a technology explanation of growth and income distribution rather than economic 
models of decreasing returns to capital.
1  Essentially, innovation in firms alone cannot explain 
observed differences in growth performances across countries.  So while the capacity to 
innovate and to realize the potential of new technologies is one of the main sources of economic 
growth, it is the diffusion of these new products and processes across firms, industries, and 
countries that leads to widespread increases in productivity and economic welfare.  The 
economic field of technology spillover, and diffusion more generally, remains under-explored, 
which may explain in part why recent efforts have not been successful at providing a more 
fundamental understanding of the processes underlying economic growth. 
Similarly, recent attempts of the so-called new growth literature have made an important 
contribution by emphasizing the importance of the sources of economic growth.  However, their 
success in modeling experienced growth has been limited both for cross-sectional and time-
series evidence (Durlauf and Quah, 1999; Jones, 1998; Temple, 1999).  As Nelson (1998) has 
pointed out, this puzzle between the predictions of the theory and observed growth may be a 
consequence of the level of aggregation of (mostly macro-) economic variables under 
investigation.  As a result scholars have recently focused their research efforts on a more 
disaggregated analysis of the patterns of technical change.
2  Most of the work, however, has 
been directed at the study of one particular aspect in the process of technological growth namely 
the generation of new products and processes￿inventions and innovations￿rather than the 
spread of novel ideas. 
Over long periods it can be expected that productivity improvements are associated with 
technological growth.  The diffusion of technological growth across economic activities can be 
conceptualized as a process based on learning that leads to positive externalities.  In other   2 
words, the diffusion of new products and processes throughout the economy by way of learning 
generates productivity-increasing effects that are realized in economic activities outside the 
source activity.  This argument was first motivated by Allyn Young (1928) and Nicholas Kaldor 
(1966, 1975) who hypothesized that increasing returns due to learning by doing are a 
macroeconomic phenomenon as opposed to being restricted to specific (industrial) activity 
alone.   
It is our understanding of the existence of technology diffusion over space and time, that 
has motivated investigations into underlying processes and their impact on the creation of 
welfare, the distribution of income and long-term growth and development.  In a first step this 
study attempts to identify statistical regularities of productivity spillover or the diffusion of 
technological growth between sectors of the economy.  More specifically, the question will be 
asked if changes in the composition of demand (or output) are responsible for observed patterns 
of sectoral technological growth.  A model which essentially represents a modification of the so-
called Kaldor-Verdoorn law is proposed and applied to a cross-country panel data set of 47 
economies compiled from internationally compatible time-series data at the one-digit level of the 
International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) codes.  In the empirical analysis both 
parametric as well as nonlinear statistical techniques will be used to identify sectoral regularities 
of technology spillover and to ensure robustness of the results. 
The findings suggest the prevalence of technological growth diffusion at the sector level 
of the economy.  In particular, the evidence confirms a distinctive role for upstream economic 
activities like manufacturing in generating positive productivity spillovers into all other main 
sectors of the economy.  Most importantly, however, when income levels are accounted for, the 
estimates do not suggest catching up as a result of technological growth diffusion to occur in 
low-income economies. 
These findings based on the modified Verdoorn model allow for the identification of the 
diffusion of technological growth that is due to changes in demand and its composition in the 
economy.  In addition to a changing structure of the economy, other factors are expected to 
influence further the spillover potential of individual sectors.  These factors can be thought of as   3 
either facilitating or hindering the diffusion of technological growth.  In a second step, hypotheses 
with respect to these types of factors were identified and tested in order to nest the empirical 
results in more theoretical applications.  For instance, criticism has been directed particularly at 
standard growth accounting exercises that assume perfect substitutability between factors of 
production and thereby neglect to investigate the fundamentally complementary character of 
technological change (Felipe, 1999; Nelson and Pack, 1999).  Similarly, current work in the field 
of economic history of technological change by e.g. David et al. (2000) informs us of the 
necessity to explore the nature of complementarities in understanding the complexity of 
technologies. 
In a first approximation, factors that can be hypothesized as influencing the process of 
the diffusion of technological growth due to being complementary in their nature are income 
concentration, human capital and its mobility, and public investment and/or infrastructure capital 
stocks.  This attempt to identify empirical regularities of the behavior of complementary factors 
that impact on productivity spillover at the sector level of the economy may then help in the 
modeling of deterministic relationships underlying the development process, and therefore may 
inform more proactive policy-making. 
 
2. Some  concepts 
2.1  Diffusion, productivity spillovers, and technological growth 
It is, however, not an easy task to conceptualize analytically and measure and test 
empirically the phenomena that are associated with the process of technology diffusion.  At a 
methodological level the challenge is to disentangle the influences of different factors that are 
associated with technical change in general and technology diffusion in particular, like e.g. the 
effects of changing physical and human capital or changes in the structure and organization of 
production in the economy.  This may explain why there has been a recent wave of research 
activities in the area of technology diffusion, and figure 1 illustrates main concepts and their 
relationships.    4 
In the original mainstream approach to economic growth, new technologies diffuse 
instantaneously across total capital, while in later formulations, technology and technical change 
is limited by its embodiment in capital and therefore determined by the rate of investment 
(Nelson, 1981).  The result is that technological growth is transitory, and for long-run growth to 
occur exogenous impulses of new technologies are necessary. 
But until very recently even outside these mainstream formulations, economists and 
historians alike have focused their attention foremost on the aspect of invention when studying 
the question of technical progress.  Rosenberg (1982, p. 19) writes: ￿Indeed, the diffusion 
process [of new technologies] has often been assumed out of existence.  This has been done by 
identifying the economic impact of an invention with the first date of its demonstrated 
technological feasibility or￿what is hardly the same thing￿the securing of a patent.￿  Not 
surprisingly, in response to this criticism most research initiatives were directed at the inquiry into 
the diffusion of innovations, which by its nature required a better understanding of the flow of 
information and learning processes in the economy. 
As a result one major strand of research activities in the field of technical change is 
concerned with explaining the characteristic functional form of observed technology diffusion 
processes over time, i.e., the so-called S-shaped curve or logistic function.  This class of models 
takes the agent or firm as unit of analysis, and formulations are derived from population 
dynamics modeling information flows (Geroski, 2000).
3  
Out of a criticism of the mainstream growth literature that not all inventions and/or 
innovations are adopted successfully, the second major strand of research is concerned with 
explicitly modeling the inherently uncertain nature of technical change.  This class of models in 
the tradition of evolutionary growth theory, however, does not treat the diffusion process of 
innovations or more generally technologies explicitly.  In fact, in Nelson and Winter￿s (1982) 
classical model once a new technology is chosen, the old technology of a firm (or industry) is 
transformed instantaneously.
4   5 
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Source: Author.   6 
Where technology diffusion has entered into evolutionary growth modeling it is 
usually in the form of embodied technical change and (only) in this sense similar to 
mainstream formulations.  This approach utilizes the information of observed patterns of 
technology diffusion, in which vintage capital is replaced by new equipment and machinery 
according to Goodwin-type macro-dynamics, to show that stochastic processes of innovation 
are sufficient to generate long waves of economic activity (Silverberg and Lehnert, 1993).  
But overwhelmingly, the different approaches have been less clear with respect to the 
economic frameworks that are implicit in the investigations, and much work in this area of 
research remains to be done.  
 
2.2  Conceptualizing the process of technological growth diffusion  
This study￿s approach to the question of inter-sectoral diffusion of technological 
growth takes two concepts as its starting point that are not completely separate.  First, it 
explores the impact of changes in the composition of demand (or output) in the economy on 
the diffusion of technological growth.  Observed changes in production structures of the 
economy don￿t behave randomly but rather exhibit systematic behavior associated with the 
process of economic growth.  The empirical investigation therefore proposes to utilize the 
information underlying changing structural demand specifically at the sector level of the 
economy. 
Second, the so-called Kaldor-Verdoorn law (Kaldor, 1966) will be modified and 
applied to this information which will generate a matrix of inter-sectoral learning spillovers.  
The Law in its original presentation identifies a close long-run relationship between the rate 
of growth of output and productivity growth in a given industry or sector of the economy.  
When interpreted in light of the classical idea of the reserve army of labor the robust 
observed patterns suggest a technology explanation of growth due to externalities that are 
associated with learning by doing.  These aspects of learning have long been highlighted in 
the development literature, and were first reemphasized by Arrow￿s seminal article The   7 
Economic Implications of Learning by Doing (1962).  Arrow argued that externalities arising 
from learning by doing and knowledge spillover positively affect aggregate labor productivity.   
A catalog of different forms of learning can be found in Rosenberg (1982).  He 
classified learning by doing as ￿a form of learning that takes place at the manufacturing 
stage after the product has been designed, that is, after the learning in the R&D stages [..] 
has been completed.  Learning at this stage, as described by Arrow and others, consists of 
developing increasing skill in production.  This has the effect of reducing real labor costs per 
unit of output.  The significance of this process has been documented in several industries, 
including airframe production, shipbuilding, machine tools, and textiles￿ (ibid., p. 121).  
Rosenberg further distinguished a related form of learning by doing which again 
occurs as a by-product of productive activity.  This form of learning has recently received a 
lot of attention and came to be better known as incremental technological change.  Direct 
involvement in the productive process leads to many kinds of productivity improvements that 
are often individually small but cumulatively very large.  It is probably these two types of 
learning by doing that Kaldor and many authors after him had in mind when applying the 
Verdoorn law in their empirical investigations.
5 
While the productivity gains from these types of learning activities will be felt where 
they are undertaken so that they are internal to the productive activity of the firm or industry, 
there is another form of learning generated in the process of utilization.  The learning-by-
using experience generates two very different kinds of useful knowledge that may either be 
embodied or disembodied.  Rosenberg (1982, p. 123) writes:  ￿In the former, the early 
experience with a new technology leads to better understanding of the relationship between 
specific design characteristics and performance that permit subsequent improvements in 
design.  In the case of disembodied knowledge, the knowledge generated leads to certain 
alterations in use that require no (or only trivial) modifications in hardware design.  Here, 
prolonged experience with the hardware reveals information about performance and 
operation characteristics that, in turn, leads to new practices that increase the productivity of 
the hardware￿either by lengthening its useful life or by reducing the operating costs.￿   8 
These modifications are simultaneously fed by downstream and upstream sources 
that lie outside the economic activity￿say industry or sector￿that absorbs them.  The 
steady flow of small improvements will show up as efficiency increases in the production of 
the absorbing sector.  It can be further expected that any one economic activity represents a 
source as well as an absorber of the consequences of learning by using, which taken 
together will yield a matrix of inter-sectoral learning.  The following section will propose a 
model that attempts to capture observed patterns of the diffusion of learning between 
sectors in the economy. 
 
2.3  A simple model  
First, it is hypothesized that the Verdoorn law, which in its simplest form states a 
positive statistical relationship between output growth and the rate of growth of labor 
productivity over the long run, also extends to inter-sectoral or inter-industry diffusion of 
learning.  In other words, demand or output growth in one sector of the economy positively 
affects another sector￿s productivity growth as a result of learning spillovers.  In essence, this 
model therefore captures the impact of technological growth that originates with a changing 
composition of demand or structure of production in the economy. 
Estimations of the modified Verdoorn model are based on three main variables: value 
added, employment and labor productivity at the sector or industry level of the postwar 
economy.  The relationship is specified as: 
 
pjkt = α0 + βqikt, with expectation β >  0              ( 1 )    
where  
q = output growth, 
p = productivity growth, 
i, j = sector,  
k = country, and  
t = time.   9 
In words, the output growth in sector i is expected to show a positive relationship with 
the rate of growth of productivity in sector j over the long run.  The estimations of the 
relationship will provide a matrix of coefficients that measures every sector￿s potential as 
source of technological growth resulting from sectoral learning spillover as well as its 
potential to ￿absorb￿ the spillovers from all the other sectors in the economy.  
It is necessary to control for the influence of own-sector output growth on the rate of 
growth of productivity of sector j, that is, the original specification of Verdoorn￿s (1949) 
relationship.  In order to circumvent the problem of multicollinearity between sectoral output 
growth rates, the so-called Rowthorn formulation of the Verdoorn law was introduced to the 
specification.  Rowthorn (1975) proposed this formulation of using changes in employment 
as the regressor on productivity in his debate with Kaldor (1966, 1975) over the accuracy of 
his interpretation of the Verdoorn law of increasing returns.
6  Mathematically speaking, 
multiple formulations of the production relation are possible based on the productivity identity 
(P≡Q/E).  After differentiating the change in productivity is equal to the difference between 
output growth and the rate of growth of employment.  In fact, estimates of alternative 
formulations would give equivalent results if the association measured is exact or a close fit. 
In addition to the hypothesis of a positive long-run relationship between the rate of 
growth of productivity in sector j and output growth in sector i, it can be expected that the 
observed behavior of different sectors can be distinguished from one another.  Thus further 
statistical testing is directed at the question of significant differences in spillover potentials of 
individual sectors. 
 
3.  A matrix of learning 
3.1  Data and methodology 
Estimations of the model are based on a panel data set for the postwar period with a 
breakdown at the one-digit level of the ISIC codes, i.e., 9-10 main economic activities or 
sectors depending on country data availability.  The data sets consist of two main time series 
on sectoral value added and employment, and sectoral labor productivity levels and growth   10 
rates are computed based on the former two data series.  The main economic activities 
covered are: (1) agriculture, forestry and fishing, (2) mining and quarrying, (3) 
manufacturing, (4) public utilities, (5) construction, (6) wholesale and retail trade and hotel 
and restaurants (henceforth ￿commerce￿), (7) transport and communication, (8) finance, 
insurance and real estate (￿FIRE￿), (9) community, social personal services, and (10) 
government services. 
The panel data set was compiled based on three main international sources which 
yielded consistent series for 30 low-income and 17 high-income countries.  First, the time 
series for low-income countries come from (1) the International Labour Office for sectoral 
employment data, and (2) UN National Accounts for value added with the same sector 
breakdown.  For additional low-income countries national data sources were used (see data 
appendix for details).  The 30 low-income countries cover sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America, South and East Asia for the period from 1975 to the early 1990s.     
Since the 1970s the U.N. system of statistics has devised detailed survey guidelines 
for its collection of national data to ensure consistency for international comparison.  This is 
why the two sets of sectoral data series can be considered to be consistent over time and 
space.  Most importantly for the investigations at hand, however, the two sets of employment 
and output series are compatible with respect to the sector breakdown according to ISIC 
codes. 
Additionally, a considerable effort was spent in particular on the raw series of the ILO 
to work on consistency of the sectoral employment data.  The majority of the data is from 
national household or establishment surveys, and was further classified according to its 
quality based on criteria like for example changing definitions, discrepancies between figures 
for aggregate employment and the sum of sectoral employment, and obvious measurement 
errors.  Then only country series of medium or high data quality were selected for inclusion 
in the study.  Ultimately it was the sectoral employment series due to overall availability and 
exclusion based on poor quality that limited the size of the developing country sample to 30 
(while consistent value added series at the sector level are more widely available).    11 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that it probably represents the best time-series data 
available for developing country employment at this time. 
 
Table 1:  Data coverage of regions and countries 
OECD  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States  
Sub-Saharan Africa  Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, Venezuela 
South and East Asia  India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand 
Other  Turkey, Jordan 
 
Source: See data appendix for details. 
 
Second, for high-income countries the majority of the historical evidence is from the 
OECD￿s International Sectoral Data Base (ISDB) 1998; and was supplemented by Leacy 
and Urquhart (1983), Pilat (1994), Banco de Portugal (1997), and van Ark and Crafts (1996) 
for data on Canada, Japan, Portugal, and Spain, respectively.  For most of the OECD 
countries data is available from 1950 to the late 1990s.  Table 1 shows the regional and 
country coverage of the resulting country panel. 
The time series of value added, employment, and labor productivity were smoothed 
by taking 5-year log growth rates, which leaves about 100-130 observations per sector 
sample.  It was necessary to eliminate cyclical fluctuations because the modified Kaldor-
Verdoorn model is concerned with the long-run relationship of technological growth diffusion 
between sectors, and it is in this sense not a ￿proper￿ panel set up of the data.
7 
The second part of the empirical analysis investigates the question if factors such as 
income level and concentration, and human and public capital stocks influence the different 
sectors potential to absorb spillovers from the other sectors in the economy.  The theoretical   12 
and methodological issues involved are discussed in detail in sections 4 and 5.  Additional 
country data was collected on three main indicators: (i) income inequality, (ii) educational 
attainment, and (iii) public investment or infrastructure stock variables (see data appendix for 
sources and coverage). 
 
3.2 Estimates 
The results from estimating the modified Kaldor-Verdoorn model which capture the 
effects of a changing sectoral composition of demand on technological growth diffusion are 
summarized in table 2.  The estimates are based on data for 47 countries after influential 
outliers were removed from the sample (see table notes for details on techniques used to 
identify outliers).  The left-hand column lists the ￿source￿ sector of the technological growth 
spillover, while the top row indicates the sector receiving or ￿absorbing￿ the spillover.  The 
cells of the matrix show the estimates of the partial coefficients (βij) on sector i’s output 
growth rate and t-statistics. 
In accordance with the model￿s expectation the βij-coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant for the majority of cases.  The estimates suggest a positive 
relationship between the rate of growth of output of the source sector and productivity growth 
in the absorbing sector, and thus support the hypothesis of the prevalence of inter-sectoral 
diffusion of technological growth. 
The findings further show differences in the magnitude of the growth spillover across 
sectors.  The patterns reveal three distinctive groups or classes of sectors that allow us to 
develop a taxonomy based on their diffusion potential.  Most strikingly, upstream sectors, 
i.e., manufacturing, public utilities, construction, and transport and communication, tend to 
have a higher spillover coefficient than the other sectoral activities.  On the other hand, 
natural resource exploiting or downstream sectors (agriculture and mining) show very small 
potential for technological growth diffusion.  Services, like e.g. commerce, FIRE and social 
and government services, appear to form a third intermediate class of sectoral activities.  On   13 
average they are not as weak a source for spillover as the downstream sectors yet they are 
not as strong as compared to upstream sectors. 
The estimates suggest similar statistical regularities when the sectors are considered 
in terms of their capacity to absorb technological spillover from other sectors.  Again the 
natural resource exploiting sectors seem to have a relatively smaller absorptive capacity, 
while the upstream sectors are not only better sources for spillover but are also better at 
absorbing them.  Services activities particularly social and government services absorb a 
relatively higher spillover from other services upstream (e.g. commerce, transport and FIRE) 
than from upstream production activities such as construction and manufacturing. 
The finding of stronger learning spillovers being associated with upstream economic 
activities further suggests an interpretation of the β-coefficient that is more consistent with an 
explanation of sectoral growth that is due to the diffusion of technological growth.  A simple 
pulling along of downstream activities would show up in a relatively higher β-coefficient to 
the left of the diagonal in the matrix of table 2 considering that the sectors are arranged from 
downstream to upstream from left to right.  However, higher values of β-coefficients are 
found on the right hand side of the diagonal of the matrix. 
These results remain robust when fixed country and time effects are included in the 
estimations.  One way of interpreting the changes in some of the estimates for individual β-
coefficients as compared to the model without fixed effects is that other factors which are 
important for the diffusion behavior of sectors besides a changing composition of demand 
have not yet been accounted for.  The following sections will take up some of these factors.   14 
Table 2: Inter-sectoral spillovers: βij-coefficients
a for 47 countries (t-statistics) 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aAfter removing outliers above 3 standard deviations. The estimates were robust when alternative 
techniques were applied in identifying influential observations. For instance, Cook’s Distance was 
used which tests for the change in an OLS estimate resulting from omitting the i
th observation. 
 
*Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
**Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
***Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Source: Author￿s calculations. See data appendix for details. 
 
 
   15 
4.  Inter-sectoral productivity spillovers, income level, and concentration 
4.1  Inter-sectoral spillovers and catching up  
The estimation results suggest a substantial role for diffusion of learning across 
sectors as a source for economic growth, which thus may help in explaining differences in 
per capita income levels.  The applied growth literature identifies a tendency for less 
developed countries to catch up to the world technological leaders, which implies that 
productivity growth across countries will be inversely related to their initial productivity levels 
or income per capita.  Convergence of countries to a shared long-run growth path therefore 
results from productivity to increase faster in countries that are furthest away from the 
technological frontier than in countries that are already close to it (Abramovitz, 1986).
8 
If there is a general tendency for convergence then it can be further hypothesized 
that low-income countries show a higher potential for sectoral learning spillovers than high-
income countries.  In order to test this hypothesis the data sample of 47 countries was 
divided into two groups according to the World Bank country classification.
9  The two groups 
consist of 17 high-income and 30 low-income countries where the former happens to 
coincide with the group labeled OECD countries in table 1.  
Table 3 summarizes the results from estimating the modified Kaldor-Verdoorn model 
for the two country groups.  The set up of the table is essentially the same as before where 
for every source sector the estimates for the low-income and high-income groups are shown 
in the first and second rows, respectively.  Just like the findings from the estimations for the 
whole sample, when income levels are accounted for the β-coefficient for both country 
groups support the hypothesis of a positive long-run relationship between the rate of growth 
of output in sector i and productivity growth of sector j.  
Moreover, the estimates show again differences in the magnitude of the learning 
spillovers across sectors for both country groups.  The main findings can be summarized as 
follows.  First and most importantly, the same taxonomy between upstream production 
activities and downstream natural resource exploiting sectors (agriculture and mining) that 
are characterized by substantially lower spillover coefficients remains clearly identifiable.   16 
Second, with income levels accounted for an additional distinction can be made 
between the spillovers from upstream services, i.e. commerce and FIRE, and downstream 
services (social and government services).  Downstream services￿ spillovers tend to be 
relatively lower compared to upstream services for the high-income group.  The estimates, 
however, do not suggest a similar distinction for the group of low-income countries. 
Third, there is also a difference with respect to the statistical regularities of the 
absorptive capacity of sectors when income levels are accounted for.  As before the natural 
resource exploiting sectors perform relatively poorly at absorbing spillovers.  A notable 
exception is the mining sector, which shows a high absorptive capacity in the low-income 
country group.  Moreover, upstream production activities, i.e., manufacturing, public utilities, 
construction and transport and communication, reveal again the highest capacity to absorb 
spillovers as compared to the other sectoral activities. 
Fourth, maybe not surprisingly out of this group of upstream production activities the 
statistical regularities for learning spillovers are most consistent for manufacturing both as 
source and absorbing sector.  In section 4.2 the question of manufacturing activities as a 
source for the diffusion of technological growth will be examined in more detail.  
Finally, in order to examine the question of cross-country convergence the two 
country samples are compared based on the taxonomy of inter-sectoral diffusion.  On the 
one hand, there is no apparent difference between low and high-income countries in the 
magnitude of learning spillovers of both types of downstream activities￿natural resource 
exploitation and social services.  On the other hand, an overall tendency for the spillover 
coefficient to be higher in the high-income group can be found for the two types of upstream 
activities￿services and particularly production sectors.  A noteworthy exception among the 
latter is the transport and communication sector, which tends to generate higher spillovers in 
low-income countries.   17 
Table 3: Low vs. high per capita income levels (βij-coefficients
a and t-statistics) 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aSee table 2. 
 
 
bNo government services data available for low-income countries. 
 
Source: Author￿s calculations. See data appendix for details. 
 
The upstream production activities esp. manufacturing, public utilities and 
construction also perform relatively better as absorbing sectors in high-income countries.  
Transport and communication is again an exception with higher absorptive capacity in low-
income countries.  Regarding the downstream natural resource exploiting sectors there is no 
difference in the absorption of learning spillovers for agriculture.  However, mining receives   18 
substantially more spillover in low-income countries.  With respect to downstream and 
upstream services the estimates do not show a clear tendency for better absorption of 
spillovers in both country groups. 
Based on these findings there appears to be no evidence supporting the hypothesis 
of low-income country convergence.  In fact, the identified diffusion patterns in particular of 
upstream activities are more consistent with a tendency for low-income economies to fall 
behind the group of high-income countries.  Stated slightly differently it appears that low per 
capita income is associated with relatively lower potential for the diffusion of technological 
growth.     
Next in order to test for statistical robustness of this tendency the pairs of estimates 
of sectoral β-coefficients were compared for the two income groups.  The results from 
testing for statistically significant differences between sector estimates are shown in table 
4a.  Critical values were calculated to test the null hypothesis of equality between a pair of β-
coefficients for the same source sector i in the two country groups.  The findings can be 
summarized following the identified taxonomy of sectoral learning spillovers.  For 
downstream service activities the null hypothesis of equality between coefficients on output 
growth of sector i could not be rejected for the majority of sector pairs.  Similarly, the test 
results show no statistically significant differences for agriculture in the class of downstream 
natural resource exploiting sectors.  On the other hand, when income levels are controlled 
for mining as source sector for learning spillovers shows significant differences for four out of 
eight absorbing sectors with bigger (though low in magnitude) coefficients for the group of 
low-income countries.  As mentioned above mining performs also better as absorbing sector 
in low-income countries. 
Out of the class of upstream production activities about half of the sector pairs show 
significantly higher spillover coefficients for high-income countries.  Moreover, the results 
from testing for significantly higher β-coefficients of upstream service activities are also in 
favor of the high-income group.  The transport and communications sector is an exception in   19 
the class of upstream production activities because the learning spillovers are substantially 
higher for the low-income group in three out of eight sector pairs.  
In sum, the statistical tests found significant differences in spillover coefficients 
between sector pairs of the two income groups.  These differences, however, do not lend 
support to the hypothesis of cross-country convergence in income per capita levels because 
there is no general tendency for low-income countries to have higher learning spillovers.  
Instead, based on our understanding of the importance of upstream production activities 
where high-income countries tend to have significantly higher inter-sectoral learning 
spillovers the findings suggest the possibility of falling behind due to comparatively less 
diffusion of technological growth across sectors in low-income countries.  
 
 
Table 4: Significant differences between main sectors￿ spillovers (critical values)
a 
 






Source sector  agriculture mining manufacturing  public 
utilities 





agriculture  NA  -- --  -- --  -- --  --  1.50*  -- 
mining --  NA  1.88**  --  2.11** 2.04**  --  2.03**  -- -- 
manufacturing --  --  NA  --  1.88**  --  1.50* 1.43*  -- -- 
public utilities  1.91**  1.92**  --  NA  1.32* --  --  --  1.34* -- 
construction --  --  --  3.65***  NA  3.24***  --  --  --  -- 
commerce --  --  --  2.94***  2.32**  NA  1.71**  --  --  -- 
transport and 
communication 
--  1.49* 2.12**  -- --  --  NA  2.75***  -- -- 
FIRE  --  -- --  --  2.14**  -- --  NA  1.59*  -- 
social  services  --  --  -- --  -- --  1.62*  -- NA  -- 
government  services  --  -- --  -- --  -- --  --  -- NA 
   20 






Source sector  agriculture mining manufacturing  public 
utilities 
















































































































































































































aUnder the assumption of normal distribution, β i ~ N (β i, V(β i), to test whether two regression 
coefficients, β 1  and β 2, drawn from samples of sizes n1 and n2, differ significantly from each other, 
critical values (z1,2) are computed as follows. With  β 1 - β 2  ~ N (β 1 - β 2, V(β 1) + V(β 2)), 
) ( ) ( 2 1
2 1






=  ~ N (0, 1). 
The null hypothesis H0: β 1  = β 2 and H1: β 1  > β 2. The following are critical values (z1,2) from the t-
statistic (1-tailed): 
*Significant at the 0.10 level z > 1.30 
**Significant at the 0.05 level z > 1.67 
***Significant at the 0.01 level z > 2.39 
 
The tables show only values of sector pairs for which the null hypothesis could be rejected. 
Highlighted values in (a) or (b) indicate that the β -coefficient is higher for the country group with low 
income level or low income concentration, respectively. 
 
bNo government services data available for low-income countries. 
 
Source: Author￿s calculations. 
 
4.2  Manufacturing activities as source for growth diffusion 
In a historical account Amsden (2001) has recently studied the group of countries 
(labeled ￿the rest￿) that was successful at converging to the world technological frontier 
during the postwar period.  She argues that the success of competing in world markets of 
the late-industrializing economy crucially depends on previously accumulated experience in 
manufacturing.
10  More generally, most research work in the area of technological change 
and growth focuses its attention more or less explicitly on the role of the manufacturing 
sector in the development process.  In particular, manufacturing activities have been at the   21 
core of the study of inventions and innovations and their diffusion.  However, it is not at all 
clear how they are interlinked with overall growth of the economy.  This section takes a 
closer look at the modified Kaldor-Verdoorn relation in the manufacturing sector as a 
possible source for either divergence or convergence of countries. 
As mentioned above the estimation results suggest manufacturing as the sector that 
is most consistently linked with all other main activities in the economy.  The statistical 
regularities reported in tables 2 and 3 show a robust long-run association for manufacturing 
both as a source of as well as a receiving sector for learning spillovers.  The panels of 
figures 2 and 3 plot the β-coefficients on manufacturing output growth regressed on 
productivity growth for all other sectors of the low and high-income countries, respectively. 
Every panel contains the smooth curve for the receiving sector (solid line) based on 
local regression fitting, as well as sample observations and standard error of the regression 
fit (dotted lines).  A smooth fit is sensitive to the range of observations or ￿bandwidth￿ used in 
the local regressions.  A bandwidth of alpha equal to .7 appeared to not oversmooth the 
curve.  Techniques of nonlinear data smoothing allow us to relax the unnecessarily 
restrictive assumption of linearity of the statistical relationship under investigation.  They also 
have the advantage of providing additional information as compared to linear fitting 
regarding the robustness of the estimates by tracing the data closely.  In particular, through 
visualization of the statistical relationship a nonlinear estimation may reveal influential data 
points and/or heterogeneity of the samples. 
The nonlinear fits confirm the findings from the linear estimations reported in the 
previous section.  For both per capita income groups they show a stable positive relationship 
between the rate of growth of manufacturing output and productivity growth in all other 
sectors of the economy suggesting the prevalence of learning spillovers originating from 
manufacturing activity.   22 
Figure 2: Manufacturing spillover into main sectors of the economy: low-income countries 
 
Note: 
Smooth fits for manufacturing spillover are predicted based on low-income country data with a 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































o  23 
Figure 3: Manufacturing spillover into main sectors of the economy: high-income countries 
Note: 
Smooth fits for manufacturing spillover are predicted based on high-income country data with a 
bandwidth of alpha equal .7. Solid curve and dotted lines show smooth fit and standard error, 
respectively. 
 
Source: Author￿s computations. 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































o  24 
As already mentioned in section 4.1 statistical tests indicated significant differences 
in the β-coefficients on manufacturing output growth between the two income groups.  The 
question that hasn￿t been looked at yet is whether there are also differences across the two 
country groups in the statistical regularities of the sectors receiving spillovers from 
manufacturing. 
Tables 5a and 5b show critical values for testing the null hypothesis of equality 
between the β-coefficients for manufacturing on absorbing sector j.  By definition, either 
small or large sector estimates have a relatively higher probability for the null hypothesis to 
be rejected than sectors with average coefficients.  Most strikingly, the results find fewer 
differences across absorbing sectors in low-income countries as compared to absorbing 
sectors in high-income countries.  In other words, diversity in spillover behavior across 
sectors is associated with high per capita income levels. 
What the two country groups have in common is that natural resource exploiting 
sectors (agriculture and mining) and downstream services (social and government services) 
show most significant differences with the other main activities in the economy.  This again 
confirms the taxonomic regularities of sectoral activities.  Additionally, in high-income 
economies FIRE and transport and communication show significant differences in their 
absorptive capacities compared to the other sectors.   25 
Table 5: Manufacturing spillover in low and high per capita income countries (critical values)
a 
 





Absorbing sector  transport and 
communication 
commerce  public utilities  FIRE  mining  construction  social services  agriculture 
transport and 
communication NA  --  --  -- --  --  2.47***  4.34*** 
commerce 
-- NA  --  --  --  --  2.28**  4.13*** 
public utilities 
-- --  NA  --  -- --  1.83**  3.23*** 
FIRE 
-- --  --  NA  -- --  1.68**  3.12*** 
Mining 
-- --  --  --  NA  --  --  1.71** 
construction 
--  --  --  -- --  NA -- 1.60* 
social services 
2.47*** 2.28**  1.83**  1.68** --  --  NA  1.64* 
agriculture 
4.34*** 4.13***  3.23***  3.12***  1.71**  1.60* 1.64*  NA 
 












NA   --  --  2.49***  3.28***  3.53**  4.86***  2.48***  5.31*** 
construction 
-- NA    --  2.51***  3.33***  3.59***  4.99***  2.47***  5.43*** 
commerce  
-- --  NA    2.73***  3.68***  3.98***  5.67***  2.50***  5.95*** 
transport  and 
communication 2.49*** 2.51***  2.73***  NA  --  --  2.41*** 1.30*  3.21*** 
FIRE 
3.28*** 3.33***  3.68***  --  NA --  1.66*  -- 2.61*** 
social services 
3.53** 3.59***  3.98***  --  -- NA  1.42*  -- 2.42*** 
government services 
4.86***  4.99*** 5.67*** 2.41***  1.66*  1.42*  NA    --  1.36* 
Mining 
2.48*** 2.47***  2.50***  1.30*  --  --  --  NA    -- 
agriculture 
5.31***  5.43*** 5.95*** 3.21***  2.61***  2.42***  1.36* -- NA 
 
Notes: 
a,bSee table 4.  
Source: Author￿s calculations. 
 
4.3 Income  concentration 
The analysis which so far has focused on the effect of a changing structure of 
demand on the behavior of inter-sectoral learning spillovers will now be extended to other 
factors that may positively or negatively affect the diffusion of technological growth.  One 
such factor that can be hypothesized as hampering the diffusion of technologies￿both 
embodied, and disembodied in the form of learning spillovers￿is the concentration of 
resources and particularly of income in the economy.   26 
At the macroeconomic level of the analysis the distribution or concentration of 
income has traditionally played a fundamental role in classical models of the determination 
of growth and technological change.  Furthermore, the findings of recent empirical 
investigations into observed patterns of growth have emphasized the importance of income 
concentration by presenting a strong significant negative relation between the two for both 
historical panel data and postwar cross-section evidence (Perotti, 1992; Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994). 
Beginning with the economic history work of the 1960s concentration has also played 
a key role in explaining growth and the spread of new technologies at the micro level￿
sector or industry￿of the economy.  The relationship is often explored either in association 
with the size of the investments required for the adoption of the new technology (Mansfield, 
1968), or changes in relative factor prices (David, 1966).  For instance, in his influential study 
about technology diffusion David found that the spread of a particular capital good in 
agriculture (for example the reaper in the American Midwest from the 1830s through the 
1850s) was a function of farm size.  Only farms that were above a certain threshold in terms 
of their size adopted the new production technique embodied in the capital equipment early 
on, while the diffusion of the new technique was delayed for small family-sized farms.  In 
other words, the concentration of resources hampers the widespread adoption of a new 
harvest technique or the diffusion of new technologies more generally. 
This section will apply these ideas in the context of the modified Kaldor-Verdoorn 
law.  The question is whether income concentration has an effect on the regularities of 
learning spillovers identified above.  In arriving at a statistically testable hypothesis, first a 
few words on the methodology and data applied.  There are a number of different indicators 
of the concentration or the distribution of income.  Invariably, however, these tend to be at 
the aggregate level of the economy.  More disaggregated statistical measures at the sector 
level are not available least for a large panel of countries.  This investigation relies on the 
most common indicator for income distribution, the Gini coefficient of income inequality.  
Based on average Gini coefficients for the period between the early 1950s and the mid-  27 
1990s the 47 countries included in the sectoral panels were classified into low vs. high 
income concentration groups.
11 
Table 6 summarizes the estimation results for the β-coefficients of the 10 sectors 
based on the income concentration classification.  First, the estimates for both country 
groups support the prediction of the modified Kaldor-Verdoorn model of a positive 
relationship between the rate of growth of output in sector i and productivity growth in sector 
j.   
Second, the previously identified sector taxonomy is also apparent when the country 
sample is grouped according to income concentration.  Thus, the natural resource exploiting 
sectors (agriculture and mining) again show least potential for learning spillovers.  At the 
other extreme upstream production activities (manufacturing, public utilities, construction, 
and transport and communication) have the biggest sectoral spillover coefficients.  Similarly, 
the dichotomy for services activities is also repeated with comparably higher diffusion 
originating from upstream FIRE and commerce than from the downstream services. 
In addition to supporting the taxonomy the classification of countries based on 
income concentration reveals further regularities in inter-sectoral spillovers compared to the 
findings from the previous two estimations of the model (whole sample, and country 
groupings according to income level).  In particular, the estimates suggest that learning 
spillovers are comparably higher in source sectors of countries with low income 
concentration. 
  The null hypothesis of equality between sector regression coefficients from the two 
country groups was investigated using the same statistical test as described above.  Critical 
values were calculated for comparing pairs of corresponding β-coefficients for sectors of low 
vs. high income concentration. The results are presented in table 4b. 
In particular, the upstream production activities of manufacturing, public utilities and 
construction show significantly higher inter-sectoral learning spillovers in countries with low 
income inequality.  Similarly, higher spillovers from commerce as source sector are 
associated with low income inequality.     28 
Table 6: Low vs. high income concentration (βij-coefficients





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aSee table 2. 
 
Source: Author￿s calculations. See data appendix for details. 
 
The results for the natural resource exploiting sectors are most notable.  While 
agriculture shows substantially higher inter-sectoral spillovers in countries with low 
concentration of income, mining performs significantly better both as source as well as 
absorbing sector in countries with high concentration of income.  Another exception to the 
general tendency for stronger diffusion of technological growth to be associated with low   29 
income inequality is FIRE for which the findings suggest that it generates significantly higher 
spillovers in concentrated economies. 
 
5.  Public capital stocks and productivity spillovers 
5.1 Human  capital 
The following two sections will focus on the role of public capital￿both human and 
physical￿for productivity spillovers between sectors in the economy.  In particular, human 
capital has been given a lot of attention in models of technical change and measures of 
human capital have been applied in numerous cross-section and time-series studies of both 
the augmented Solow approach or endogenous growth models.  There are important 
lessons to be learned from the different approaches, however, only the main arguments can 
briefly be summarized here.
12  First, the most important result of the study of observed 
growth is that models based on human or knowledge capital overpredict technical change 
and therefore growth rates of income per capita.  Statistics show that human capital and 
research intensity in advanced countries have increased dramatically over time, yet per 
capita income growth rates have roughly remained constant (Jones, 1998).  Second, similar 
to other explanatory variables human capital measures in particular human capital 
investments have been shown to have problems of robustness when used in cross-country 
growth regressions (Wolff, 2000).  Thus while it has been widely accepted that human 
capital plays an important role for technical change and long-run development more 
generally, it is probably now also accepted that the nature of the interrelation with long-term 
growth performance is complex. 
For instance, commonly in the framework of the augmented Solow model the effects 
are captured by introducing human capital in form of an additional input into the aggregate 
production function, which assumes constant elasticity of substitution of factor inputs.  
However, more disaggregated analyses are better suited for the conceptualization of 
alternative, more realistic channels through which human capital interacts with growth.  
Especially sector, industry or firm models that attempt to capture ideas of the diffusion of   30 
technological growth over space and time lend themselves for the analysis of the flow or 
mobility of resources between economic activities.  Human capital, i.e., skill and knowledge, 
is, of course, embodied in people, and the migration of labor between economic activities 
was identified by classical development economists like W. Arthur Lewis and Simon Kuznets 
as one of the most important stylized facts in the development process.  However, the 
mobility of labor was not merely seen as a result of changing factor prices but rather as 
structural shifts that coincide with fundamental socio-economic transformations like e.g. the 
declining importance of agricultural activities along with intensive urbanization, or the 
development of the welfare state.   
While some of these earlier transformations are not yet completed in many parts of 
the world we may already be faced with similar dramatic changes of what has been labeled 
the ￿knowledge-based economy.￿  Only time will tell of the extend of the recent changes, but 
what the early development work has taught us is that the role of mobility or flow of human 
capital for technological growth diffusion goes beyond mere factor substitution and requires 
an understanding of co-evolving social and economic institutions.  
Human capital or education may thus play a complementary role, and only its co-
evolution or the combination with other necessary factors may facilitate successful 
development.
13  A slightly different but related way of thinking about human capital is the 
already mentioned and widely accepted idea of social capabilities (simply a broader 
definition of human capital) which have to be in place for successful development to occur 
(Abramovitz, 1986).  This premise that the state of education facilitates economic 
performance will be examined by applying human capital indicators to the modified Kaldor-
Verdoorn model.  It is expected that the state of human capital in the economy is associated 
positively with learning spillovers between sectors. 
The methodology of applying human capital to the idea of spillovers is limited by the 
availability of suitable data at the sector level for a broad number of countries.  In particular, 
there is no consistent evidence on the flow of human capital between sectors.  Further, due 
to the mentioned robustness problems with indicators of human capital investments in cross-  31 
sectional studies this investigation relies on a composite index that measures stocks of 
human capital in the country.
14  The countries covered in the sample were grouped 
according to an index of human capital stocks using the country median as the cutoff for 
countries with low levels vs. countries with high levels of educational attainment.  
The main findings can be summarized as follows (see table 7).  First, the results 
confirm the sector taxonomy of productivity spillovers due to learning identified in sections 
3.2 and 4.1.  The upstream production sectors and here again manufacturing activities show 
the strongest learning spillovers.  
The pattern of unsubstantial spillovers for the downstream resource exploiting 
sectors also does not change as compared to the earlier results when educational 
attainment is accounted for.  Similarly the estimation results for the upstream services 
activities particularly FIRE suggest higher spillovers compared to the downstream service 
sectors.  
Second, the findings support the hypothesis of a positive association between the 
productivity spillover of a given sector and the stock of human capital in the economy.  The 
estimates suggest an overall tendency of the sectoral spillovers to be higher for the group of 
countries with high educational attainment.  The hypothesis of systematic differences 
between sector pairs of spillover coefficients from the two country groups was tested for 
statistical significance.  Table 8a shows critical values for those cases for which the null 
hypothesis of equality between coefficients could be rejected.   
Sector pairs with significantly bigger β-coefficients for the country group with 
comparably high educational attainment are highlighted in the table.  They clearly outnumber 
the cases for which the spillover coefficients are significantly bigger in countries with low 
human capital stocks.  Most strikingly, significantly stronger productivity spillovers of the 
upstream production activities (manufacturing and public utilities) are associated with high 
educational attainment.  But also agriculture, commercial services and upstream FIRE 
activities show a significant tendency for productivity spillovers to be stronger in countries   32 
with high human capital stocks.  In sum, these findings suggest an overall positive 
association between human capital and productivity spillovers at the sector level. 
 
 
Table 7: Low vs. high educational attainment (βij-coefficients
a and t-statistics) 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aSee table 2. 
 
bNo government services data available for countries with low educational attainment. 
 
Source: Author￿s calculations. See data appendix for details. 
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5.2  Infrastructure investment and capital stock  
Similarly to the treatment of human capital as a source for development the problem 
of public capital, more specifically the accumulation of public investment or stocks of 
infrastructure has received a lot of attention in the theoretical and empirical literature on 
long-run growth and technical change.  Considerable controversy remains as regards the 
relative importance of public and private physical capital in the economic growth process.  
Aschauer (1989) was the first to demonstrate strong positive effects of public capital on 
economic performance.  In contrast, Barro (1991) finds that public capital investment and 
private capital investment have similar effects on growth based on a cross-section of 98 
countries.  In another cross-section study Easterly and Rebelo (1993) identify an important 
role for particular infrastructure capital in the area of transport and communication.
15 
A corollary issue of the question over the relationship between public capital and 
economic performance has also recently been treated in the literature.  This work addresses 
the question over the importance of the effectiveness, or ￿efficiency,￿ of public capital to the 
growth process (Hulten, 1996).  In a cross-country study Aschauer (2000) has merged these 
related aspects and finds evidence that both the amount of public capital accumulated and 
its efficiency have significant positive effects on output per worker.
16 
Without doubt these are important findings not least for the formulation of economic 
development policies.  However, overwhelmingly, these investigations into the relationship 
between public capital and growth performance and technical change remain at the 
aggregate level of the economy.  Most importantly, both theoreticians and practitioners 
understand that fiscal policy may introduce sectoral biases, in particular the disproportionate 
support of urban economic activities.
17  Thus more directed development policies may 
benefit from disaggregated analysis into the relationship between public capital and the 
performance of different sectors in the economy.   34 










agriculture mining  manufacturing public 
utilities 





agriculture NA  1.31*  --  1.39*  1.98** --  -- --  --  -- 
mining  --  NA  --  1.45*  -- -- --  2.95***  --  -- 
manufacturing --  1.38*  NA  1.30* 2.15** 2.89***  -- --  --  -- 
public utilities  2.33**  1.71** --  NA  2.32** 1.60* 1.34* --  2.60***  -- 
construction  -- -- --  --  NA --  --  2.32**  --  -- 
commerce  1.52**  --  3.36*** 3.84***  2.54**  NA  2.30** 2.36**  -- -- 
transport and 
communication 
-- 2.89*** --  --  --  1.37*  NA -- --  -- 
FIRE --  2.30**  2.77*** 2.24**  2.54*** 3.40*** 1.97** NA --  -- 
social  services  -- -- --  2.03**  --  --  1.35* -- NA  -- 
government 
services 
-- -- --  -- --  --  --  --  --  NA 
 






agriculture mining  manufacturing public 
utilities 





agriculture NA  --  2.65***  1.99**  1.41*  1.91**  --  2.84***  --  -- 
mining  --  NA  --  1.99**  -- --  --  --  -- -- 
manufacturing  -- -- NA -- -- 2.28**  -- --  --  -- 
public  utilities  --  -- --  NA  --  -- --  --  2.16**  -- 
construction --  1.68**  1.31*  2.69***  NA  --  1.90**  3.51***  --  -- 
commerce --  1.82**  2.49***  2.18**  2.29**  NA  --  --  --  -- 
transport and 
communication 
--  -- -- --  1.60*  --  NA  --  --  -- 
FIRE --  --  2.25** 2.38**  --  2.79*** 2.57***  NA  1.40*  -- 
social  services  --  -- -- --  --  -- --  --  NA -- 
government 
services 
--  -- -- --  --  -- --  --  -- NA 
 
Notes: 
aSee table 4.  
 
The tables show values only for sector pairs for which the null hypothesis could be rejected. 
Highlighted values in (a) or (b) indicate that the β -coefficient is higher for the country group with high 
educational attainment or high infrastructure capital stock, respectively. 
 
bNo government services data for (a) countries with low educational attainment, and (b) countries for 
which infrastructure capital data is available. 
 
Source: Author￿s calculations. 
 
The same data methodology as in the previous sections is applied here to explore 
the effect of investment and accumulation of physical public capital on the diffusion of   35 
technological growth.  The countries in the sample were classified according to indicators of 
public capital.  It is expected that similar to the findings for the aggregate economy public 
investment and stocks of public capital have a positive effect on inter-sectoral productivity 
spillovers.  And similar to Hulten￿s (1996) and Aschauer￿s (2000) analyses, evidence on 
public investment, physical public capital stocks, and measures of the efficiency of public 
capital are utilized.
18   
The data for public investment in percent of GDP is taken from the World Bank 
(Pfeffermann et al., 1997).  Measures for the latter two aspects of physical public capital￿
amount and efficiency￿are also from the World Bank (1994).  They cover the following 
infrastructure areas: (i) power, (ii) telecommunications, (iii) paved roads, (iv) water, and (v) 
railways.  Based on these public capital indicators the countries in the sample were 
classified into two groups.
19  The country group with relatively high public capital in terms of 
quantity and quality is expected to show higher productivity spillovers between sectors than 
the group of countries with low public capital. 
Table 9 presents the estimation results for the matrix of inter-sectoral spillovers.  The 
taxonomy of productivity spillovers between sectors remains robust when public capital is 
accounted for.  The upstream production activities of manufacturing, public utilities, 
construction, and transport and communication exhibit again higher spillover coefficients 
than the downstream activities of the natural resource exploiting sectors.  And also the 
upstream services sectors, in particular FIRE, suggest higher spillover potential than 
downstream service activities, like for example the social services. 
In addition, there is now a sharp distinction between the high spillover sectors 
associated with high public capital development and the high spillover sectors associated 
with low public capital development (cf. table 8b).  Based on testing for statistical differences 
between sectors FIRE shows the clearest pattern of significantly higher sectoral β-
coefficients for the country group with relatively higher public capital.  In contrast, for three 
sectors, agriculture, construction and commercial services, the estimates suggest that   36 




Table 9: Low vs. high infrastructure capital (βij-coefficients
a and t-statistics) 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aSee table 2. 
 
bNo government services data for countries for which infrastructure capital stock data is available. 
 
Source: Author￿s calculations. See data appendix for details. 
 
One plausible way of interpreting this latter finding in particular for the agricultural 
sector is that the infrastructure measures utilized here, like e.g. power and water supply,   37 
roads and phone lines, essentially capture the fiscal policy bias already mentioned above.  It 
is fair to say that in less developed countries a bias towards urban economic activities 
appears to dominate.  This may explain why agriculture shows significantly higher 
productivity spillovers in countries where infrastructure capital stocks are relatively smaller, 
which in turn may represent less skewed fiscal policies.  Of course, this is not to say that the 
agricultural sector does not benefit from public capital development. 
 
6. Conclusions 
While it is widely accepted that the diffusion of technological growth across time and 
space is an important source of economic performance, this research area continues to be 
under-explored.  This paper investigated the existence and character of technological growth 
diffusion in form of sectoral learning spillovers.  Learning represents an essential component 
in the process of diffusion of technological change.  Many scholars have stressed that the 
fundamental nature of technological growth is the result of incremental changes, often 
individually small but cumulatively very large.  Two related forms of learning￿learning by 
doing and learning by using￿have been identified in the literature, and the proposed 
extension of the Kaldor-Verdoorn model utilizes the ideas of the latter. 
The production process of a given economic sector is simultaneously fed technical 
modifications originating in downstream and upstream activities.  The steady flow of small 
improvements will show up as efficiency increases in the production of the sector that 
absorbs them.  In terms of the extended Kaldor-Verdoorn model, it can be expected that the 
rate of growth of output or demand in one sector of the economy positively affects another 
sector￿s productivity growth.  In essence, this model captures the impact of technological 
growth that results from a changing composition of demand.  It can further be expected that 
any one economic activity represents a source as well as an absorber of the consequences 
of learning by using, which taken together will yield a matrix of inter-sectoral learning.   
Based on panel data for 47 countries during the postwar period the identified 
statistical regularities support the hypothesis of the diffusion of technological growth as a   38 
result of a changing structure of demand.  The evidence further suggests robust differences 
across sectors in the magnitude of productivity spillovers.  In particular, the patterns reveal a 
distinctive role for upstream production activities, especially manufacturing, as a source of 
technological growth diffusion. 
No significant differences in these patterns were found between low and high-income 
countries.  Thus, the estimated spillover potential of sectors in low-income economies does 
not suggest a tendency for catching-up to occur.  However, higher potential of technological 
growth diffusion at the sector level was found to be associated with (i) low income 





A. Data sources for low-income countries 
 
Value added at constant prices 
The country data for value added used in the paper is taken from the annual series ￿Gross 
Domestic Product by Kind of Activity (at constant prices)￿ of the U.N. National Accounts which was 
provided by the United Nations Statistics Division, New York.  The data is in national currency and is 
arranged according to the International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) code at the one-digit 
level, i.e. it covers nine main ￿activities￿ or sectors.  The sum total of these nine sectors￿ real value 
added (excluding ￿producers of government services￿) gives the gross domestic product (GDP) at 
factor prices.  For most countries, the series covers the period from the mid-1970s to 1993. 
  For Brazil, sectoral output data is taken from Estatísticas Historicas do Brasil: Series 
Economicas, demograficas e sociais de 1550 a 1988, 2nd ed., Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estat￿stica (IBGE) 1990. 
 
Employment 
The country data for sectoral employment was provided by the International Labour Office, 
Geneva, also published in Yearbook of Labour Statistics.  It is an annual series that covers (at 
maximum) the period from 1975 to 1993.  The data is disaggregated at the one-digit level of the ISIC 
codes, the very same level of disaggregation as the country series from the U.N. National Accounts. 
  Due to a smaller country coverage of the employment series additionally national data 




Sectoral labor productivity for the countries was computed by combining the two data series 
of sectoral value added and employment described above.  In other words, sectoral productivity is 
defined as sectoral value added (here in national currency) divided by the number of persons 
employed in the sector. 
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Table A.1: Low-income country coverage 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa  Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, Venezuela 
South and East Asia  India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand 




B. Data sources for high-income countries 
 
Value added at constant prices and employment   
The main source for both the data series of real value added at the sector level and sectoral 
employment is the International Sectoral Data Base (ISDB) published by the OECD in 1998.  
Additional data sources were used for Austria, Canada, Germany, Japan, Portugal, and Spain. 
 
Table B.1: High-income country data sources and coverage 
 
Sectoral data series  Country 
  value added at constant prices  employment 
AUSTRALIA  OECD (1998)  OECD (1998) 
AUSTRIA  ￿STAT (1995)  ￿STAT (1995) 
BELGIUM  OECD (1998)  OECD (1998) 
CANADA  Leacy and Urquhart (1983); 
OECD (1998) 
Leacy and Urquhart (1983); 
OECD (1998) 
DENMARK  van Ark (1996); OECD (1998)  van Ark (1996); OECD (1998) 
FINLAND  OECD (1998)  OECD (1998) 
FRANCE  OECD (1998)  OECD (1998) 
GERMANY  van Ark (1996)  van Ark (1996) 
ITALY  OECD (1998)  OECD (1998) 
JAPAN  Pilat (1994); OECD (1998)  Pilat (1994); OECD (1998) 
NETHERLANDS  van Ark (1996); OECD (1998)  van Ark (1996); OECD (1998) 
NORWAY  OECD (1998)  OECD (1998) 
PORTUGAL  Pinheiro (1997)  Pinheiro (1997) 
SPAIN  van Ark (1996)  van Ark (1996) 
SWEDEN  OECD (1998)  OECD (1998) 
UNITED KINGDOM  OECD (1998)  OECD (1998) 




Same definition as above. 
 
 
C. Data sources for income concentration and public (physical and human) capital stocks 
 
Income distribution 
Gini coefficients and top to bottom income share ratios are from Deininger and Squire (1996).  
See source article for details on methodology and country and time period covered.  Additional data is 
from Human Development Report (UNDP).  The Gini for Myanmar is from 1958 Burma. 
Here ￿high￿ income inequality is defined by a Gini coefficient that is higher than the average 
Gini coefficient for the world, i.e., equal or greater than 36.12, and denoted by 1 (0 otherwise).  For   40 
the ratio of top quintile’s share of income to bottom quintile’s share the cutoff rate between high and 
low inequality is defined by the sample’s average ratio of 7.8.  
 
 
Public investment and capital stocks 
 
(1) Public investment 
Public investment data (in percent of GDP) for developing countries in 1975 and 1985 is from 




(2) Infrastructure stocks 
Measures of infrastructure stocks are from World Development Report (World Bank, 1994) 
covering the following indicators:  
 
(a) power supply in percent of total households in 1984; 
(b) power system losses in percent of total output in 1990; 
(c) telephone mainlines per 1000 persons in 1990; 
(d) faults per 100 mainlines per year; 
(e) road density in km per million persons in 1988; 
(f) access to safe water in percent of total population in 1990; 
(g) losses in percent of total water provision; 
(h) rail traffic in km per million US$ GDP in 1990. 
 
 
(3) Human capital indicator 
Educational attainment data for 1980-1985 is from Human Development Report (UNDP, 
1991).  The educational attainment index measures human capital stocks for a broad number of 
countries.  It is based on a weighted average of literacy rates and mean years of schooling defined as 
the average number of years of school attained by the population aged 15 and above. 
 
The individual human capital stock indicators included in the index are similar to the 
educational attainment measures collected for the human capital database by Barro and Lee (2001).  
The advantage of UNDP￿s data, however, is that it provides a ready to use composite index of human 
capital stocks for consistent cross-country comparison.    41 
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Notes 
                                                 
1Cf. Easterly and Levine (2001) for recent empirical investigations of the stylized facts of economic 
growth.  
2See for example the classic study by Pavitt (1984) on sectoral patterns of technical change using 
survey data on main innovations in postwar Britain.  Cf. also for recent work Dosi (1982) on 
technological growth regimes, and Malerba and Orsenigo (1997) for a taxonomy on industry-specific 
characteristics of innovative activities. 
3A detailed survey is beyond the scope of this paper.  See Geroski (2000) for a recent overview of 
models of the dynamic processes of technology diffusion. 
4Nelson (1998) provides a comprehensive survey of the important theoretical issues. 
5For an overview of this body of literature, see e.g. the symposium in the Journal of Post-Keynesian 
Economics (1983).  Pieper (2003) offers a recent re-examination of this relationship applying new 
nonlinear statistical techniques. 
6Kaldor (1966) interpreted the close statistical association between the long-run rate of growth of 
productivity and output of the Verdoorn law as technological growth due to learning.  He therefore 
specified long-run productivity growth as a function of the rate of growth of demand￿which he argued 
was the independent variable￿and not changes in employment.  Cf. Pieper (2003) for a recent 
discussion of the debate in the context of observed patterns of sectoral productivity growth in 30 
developing economies. 
7Using the data set for low-income economies in another paper Pieper (2003) computes 5 as well as 
10-year growth rates to estimate the Kaldor relationship.  Since there were no significant differences 
between the estimates and in the interest to preserve degrees of freedom, here 5-year averages were 
also taken because they appear to smooth these data series appropriately. 
8Since it became clear that the predictions of the so-called convergence literature have been 
supported only by experienced growth of a limited number of countries, subsequent research has 
pointed out the importance of other factors that may help explain the catching up of some countries 
over others. These types of factors, like e.g. social capabilities (Abramovitz, 1986), that attempt to 
measure a country￿s potential to assimilate technological knowledge tend to be introduced to the 
models as exogenous variables.  See Verspagen (1991) for a critique of the convergence framework 
and an explicit treatment of the possibility of falling behind of countries. 
9Data for GNP per capita in US dollars for 1975, 1985, and 1990 and the per capita income 
classification is taken from World Tables, The World Bank, various volumes.  Income groups are 
defined for 1975 (1985; 1990) as follows:  Low-income countries are those with a GNP per capita of 
less than $4500 ($6850; $7620); and high-income countries are those with a GNP per capita of $4500 
($6850; $7620) or more. 
The World Bank country classification attempts to provide comparative estimates of economic 
capacity.  Per capita income thresholds are calculated by finding a stable relationship between a 
summary measure of well-being such as poverty incidence and infant mortality on the one hand and 
economic variables including per capita GNP estimated based on the World Bank’s Atlas 
methodology on the other.  The thresholds are updated every year to incorporate the effect of 
international inflation, which is measured by the average inflation of the G-5 countries ("SDR 
deflator").  Thus, the thresholds remain constant in real terms over time.  See World Bank (2001) for a 
discussion on estimating internationally comparable per capita income numbers. 
10This group of countries ￿the rest￿￿which had elsewhere been called the ￿convergence club￿￿
comprising of China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand in Asia; 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico in Latin America; and Turkey in Europe￿had acquired enough 
manufacturing experience in the production of silk, cotton textiles, foodstuffs, and light consumer 
goods to move into mid-technology and later high-technology sectors (Amsden, 2001). 
11A Gini coefficient is an index based on household survey data measuring income inequality between 
0 and 100, where the latter represents highest possible inequality.  Data is from the World Bank data 
set by Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire.  Cf. Deininger and Squire (1996) for details on methodology 
and country and time period covered.  Additional data is from Human Development Report, UNDP, 
various years.  See data appendix for details on methodology to classify countries.  It turns out that 
the country classification based on Gini coefficients coincides with other measures of income 
concentration like for example the ratio of top quintile’s share of income to bottom quintile’s share. 
12See Durlauf and Quah (1999) and Temple (1999) for comprehensive critical reviews.  Also cf. Jones 
(1998) on observed growth and associated problems with time-series predictions of endogenous 
growth models.     45 
                                                                                                                                                        
13For instance Nelson and Sampat (2001) argue that economic performance depends crucially on the 
co-evolution of different types of ￿social technologies￿ with physical technologies. 
14See data appendix for details.  The individual human capital stock indicators included in the index 
are similar to the educational attainment measures collected for the human capital database by Barro 
and Lee (2001).  The advantage of this data, however, is that it provides a ready to use composite 
index of human capital stocks for consistent cross-country comparison.   
15There are numerous empirical studies testing whether public investment or public capital have a 
stimulating effect on the performance of economies.  For a review of the literature see Sturm et al. 
(1998).  
16One other issue is the importance of the means of financing government spending for economic 
growth.  For instance, Aschauer (2000) finds that financing physical capital accumulation out of public 
debt is negatively associated with growth in output per capita.  This aspect will not be pursued further. 
17There are of course examples where fiscal policies (at least in part) target the agricultural sector and 
thereby rural areas of economies.  Note for instance the European Union, which has subsidized 
European agriculture throughout the postwar period.  
18Unfortunately, evidence on quantities of physical public capital and/or its efficiency is only available 
for a limited number of countries.  The most comprehensive comparable data was collected by the 
World Bank (1994).  Public investment data for 1975 and 1985 is from Pfeffermann et al. (1997).  The 
public capital data covers only low and medium income countries from 1984 until 1990, which leaves 
essentially the 30 non-OECD countries of table 1.  Cf. the data appendix for more details. 
19The data appendix provides more detailed information about the individual indicators.  The individual 
indicator￿s country coverage was overall good.  For the country classification factor analysis was used 
to reduce the number of variables.  According to the commonly used standard for eliminating 
components with no explanatory power, three of the variables were sequentially removed with factor 
loadings of < .5 (i.e., public investment, railways, paved roads, respectively).  The factor analysis was 
restricted to one factor score.  Note that missing values were replaced by sample means in the factor 
analysis. 